Workers and Lessons Reinforced — Vacant Funeral Home Fire

On May 15th, North Hudson (N.J.) Regional Fire & Rescue responded to a reported fire in a vacant funeral home at 1912 New York Ave. The time of alarm was 23:40 hours. Just prior to this, normally first due companies were dispatched to an odor of gas down on 4th St., so the initial arrivers were coming from further away in the upper first and second battalions (NHRFR runs three battalions).

The additional transmission from Fire Control (our dispatch center) of “multiple calls” told us we were going to work. Battalion 1 arrived, established command, and transmitted the working fire as well as a request for a second alarm. We ride 4 engines, 2 ladders, a rescue, a BC, safety officer, and command tech along with me, the DC on a reported fire. The working fire confirmation prompts the response of a fifth engine company and an RIC team. The second alarm (and all addition alarms) brings another two engines and a ladder along with another BC.

I arrived not long after Battalion 1 and the first few companies. The fire building was an old three-story, mixed-use occupancy of ordinary construction. The first floor was once occupied by a funeral home, with apartments above on the top two floors. The fire building was attached to a similar structure on the Bravo side. This structure, like the fire building was vacant, but was completely gutted right down to the studs. The fire building was not quite as gutted as the exposure. There were tin ceilings on the top floor and much of the sheetrock was intact. On the Delta side was an open lot and Ladder 2 made the most of this lot, using it as a vantage point from which to operate. At the rear of the fire building was a one-story extension. Behind the fire building on side Charlie was a 2½-story wood frame residential dwelling with a peaked asphalt shingle roof

As I arrived, I observed a heavy black smoke condition pushing from the top floor windows on side A. There were also an abundance of power lines across side A and side B on the northern cross-street. There was also a service connection running across the front of the building in between the second and third floors. This condition thwarted roof operations from side A and any attempt at top floor horizontal ventilation from the front of the building. Ladder 3 took the front of the building, but due to the wire issue, their aerial was not effective. This made the position of ladder 2 in the adjacent lot all the more important.

Photo 1, above: A shot of the Alpha side of the building. Note the wires running across and the attached exposure. All photos by Ron Jeffers.
Photo 2, above: This is the side street on the Bravo side. The B exposure and the one-story extension can be seen and the fire building can be seen to the left of it .

Photo 3, above: This is the view from the B side parking lot. This is early on with fire breaking through the roof. Ladder 2 is conducting ventilation ops of the half-shaft windows.

I let Battalion 1 stay in command for a few minutes while I took a quick look at the back of the building. The glow that I could see in the reflection of the C exposure windows turned out to be heavy fire venting angrily from four top floor windows. Fire was also evident from the roof at the rear and breaking through the roof flashing at the edges of the roof. This fire had a good head start. I took command and as the first companies were commencing with an attack, I had to think ahead of the fire. I ordered a third alarm, primarily to secure additional water supplies. In fact, the third alarm brought companies from neighboring Hoboken, but as this was going to be a surround-and-drown operation, I released those companies relatively quickly — no use depleting two fire departments. They were used to relocate NHRFR as was several companies from Jersey City.

Lines were ordered to protect the C exposure and a second water supply was established. The first water supply was being used by the first companies on scene who were stretching lines to the top floor pf the fire building.

I also ordered lines stretched to the top floor of the Bravo exposure as I was pretty sure there would be either a common cockloft or a shaft between the two buildings or both. We got lucky here — sometimes the fire gods give you a break, but not often. There was a shaft, but the wall of the exposed building was unpierced. There was also a brick wall between the fire building and the B exposure and only a light smoke condition was evident on the top floor. I assigned a division supervisor to the B exposure and another one to the C side.

I was also concerned with the attack-line progress, as the smoke and fire were violent on the top floor rear; but I figured we could get one shot at knocking it out. Due to the power lines, we could not provide horizontal ventilation on the A side, but there seemed to be plenty on the C side and Ladder 2 was taking care of the windows on the mid-B side. The problem arose when reports of holes in the floors and collapsing ceilings were received by the command post. I decided to pull the plug on the offensive operation in the fire building and concentrate on confining the fire to the building of origin. The ladder pipes of Ladders 2 and 3 were readied and additional water supplies were secured. We used four water supplies in all. Calls went out to the utility company to kill the power. When Ladder 3’s pipe was charged, the stream crossed the high tension lines and a loud explosion was heard that instantly darkened the block. The utility company rep said that we only knocked out one of the phases, but the other two were still live, so we still had use extreme caution until the rest of the power could be shut down.

Additional large-diameter lines were also stretched to the C side to assist in knocking down the heavy fire at the rear and to protect the combustible roof of the C exposure. Companies worked from the one-story extension to accomplish this. Large diameter lines were also stretched to the D side parking lot to supplement the water power from Ladder 2. An additional line was hoisted to the top floor of the B exposure and stretched out through the scuttle to be used on the roof. In fact, a lot of opening up of the edges of the fire building roof were done from both the roof of the exposure and from Ladder 2, once we shut done the ladder pipe. These operations, conducted from safe, monitored areas, kept the fire from progressing toward the A side and cut down on the time we were to spend on this scene. A roof division supervisor was assigned to the Bravo roof to further decentralize command.

Photo 4, above: Continuing operations of the Bravo side of the structure included large diameter hand lines as well as a ladder pipe from Ladder 2.

The fire was quickly darkened down, but I did not want to let companies inside to mop up because of the condition of the building even before the fire. We continued to use master streams as needed. By using Ladder 2’s ladder pipe though the shaft window from close range as well as the opening up and stream application being conducted from the B side of the roof, the fire was confined to the rear of the structure. There was no damage to any of the exposures.

Lessons learned and reinforced

  • Always assume there is a shaft between old attached buildings — the fact that I had a half-shaft on the open Bravo side (see Photo 2) gave me sufficient evidence to believe there was one on the Delta side. A quick request for recon from the exposure roof division confirmed this.
  • Get ahead of the fire as soon as possible; it’s OK to lose one building. Losing two or more that were not involved when you got there leads to parking lots that bear your name.
  • Plan for hydraulic reserve. This requires people who know the grids.
  • Call enough people. Don’t hesitate to strike early additional alarms.
  • Don’t mess with electricity; you are dead before you hit the ground.
  • Break down the fireground. Put supervisors in all major areas you cannot see from the Command post.
  • Don’t risk your neck tonight for something that will be loaded in a dumpster tomorrow morning. So effective were the fire control operations that one of my BC’s said to me that whether we went inside to work this fire or stayed out, the resulting damage would not have been any different; and the added bonus of no injuries (that might have been sustained had we conducted prolonged interior operations) made this a winner.

Be safe.


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