Decision Making
As an incident commander, making decisions at a working fire is a lengthy, complex process that requires the consideration of a wide spectrum of strategic and tactical possibilities.
Or does it? Classical assumptions say yes. A study conducted some years ago by researchers for the U.S. Army may suggest otherwise.
Most of us are familiar with the acronym RECEO VS. It represents a range of strategic possibilities that must be considered. The letters, arranged in priority order, denote the following: (1) Rescue, (2) Exposure, (3) Confine, (4) Extinguish, (5) Overhaul, (A) Ventilation and (B) Salvage. Ventilation and Salvage are designated A and B because they may be required at any time following the initial size-up. RECEO VS was the brainchild of Chief Lloyd Layman, Parkersburg Fire Department, and is the foundation for his book Fire Fighting Tactics. Before RECEO VS can be considered, a size-up of the situation must be made. According to Layman, the size-up is the mental evaluation made by the incident commander, “which enables him to determine his course of action and to accomplish his mission.”[1]
The basic mental evolution of this system weighs the facts of the situation encountered, estimates future probabilities, and considers the situation at hand. Once this evolutionary process is underway it leads to the formation of a decision or decisions. The decisions made by the incident commander are implemented in the plan of operation. “The plan of operation is a mental diagram that illustrates how a commanding officer intends to employ his personnel, apparatus, equipment and extinguishing agents to enforce his decision and to achieve his objectives.” [2]
Facts, probabilities, situation, decision, and plan of operation form the framework of Layman's mental evolution of size-up. A system outline breaks the evolution down into more specific considerations. Under the heading “Facts” are found time of emergency, location of emergency, nature of emergency, life hazard, exposures, building or buildings involved, fire, and weather. Under “Probabilities” are found life hazard, extension of fire, explosions, collapse of component parts of involved building, weather changes, and preventable damage. Under “Situation” are personnel and equipment, additional assistance available, water supply, private fire protection, and action that has been taken. Under “Decision” are the following: initial decision and supplemental decisions. And finally, under “Plan of Operation” are orders and instructions and supervision of operations.
Each consideration under the headings of facts, probabilities, situation, decision and plan of operation is further delineated, making for a very comprehensive system. Having to weigh each item at the time of alarm or arrival at an incident is clearly too time-consuming, particularly when the time factor is so critical. This type of decision-making, as outlined by Chief Layman, is referred to as “Classical Decision-making.” If an incident commander has to resort to classical decision-making at the time of an alarm, it is unlikely the incident will be brought to a successful conclusion in a timely manner. Of course, it was never Chief Layman’s intent that this system be used at the actual time of an emergency. His primary purpose was to develop a system of training officers and future officers to familiarize themselves with the complex art of fire command.
What then is the alternative?
In 1988, Klein Associates, Inc., conducted a study for the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences titled “Rapid Decision Making on the Fire Ground.” The objective of the study was “to examine the way in which decisions are made by highly proficient personnel, under conditions of extreme time pressure and where the consequences of the decisions could affect lives and property.[3] In the fire service, decisions are frequently made under extreme time pressure. As was pointed out in the study, research in decision-making generally disregards this aspect of the process. In fact, standard decision-making models suggest a full range of options be identified, evaluated and compared — a lengthy process.
To the researchers, it seemed unlikely that decisions made by incident commander would follow standard models. In fact, they found that evaluating options was not a consideration in a majority of the decisions made by incident commanders. Incident commanders based their decisions on the recognition of a situation as something they had experienced many times before and acted accordingly. There was no protracted analytical process. It was knowledge and experience that guided their actions. Incidents present situations (cues) that, when recognized by experienced incident commanders, elicit a response that has been played out many times before. The response is almost intuitive. The key is having the ability to recognize a situation and its cues. This type of decision-making is called “Recognition Primed Decision Making.”
The study results clearly indicate that requiring incident commanders to make decisions based on a “classical” system is time-consuming and counterproductive. How then are firefighters, who lack experience and education, expected to make rapid decisions where the time element is critical and the stakes potentially high? The study suggests “it may be more efficient for training programs to be re-conceptualized to emphasize the perceptual learning needed to make fine discriminations, the array of experiences needed to develop situational awareness skills and to acquire a repertoire of options”[4]
The National Fire Academy in Emmitsburg, Maryland has taken the lead in developing and presenting an incident management curriculum that uses “Recognition Primed Decision Making” as the basis of its program. The students are taught that decision-makers need the classical method when they are in the training mode. The classical method is augmented with case studies that identify and emphasize critical cues. Finally, a more hands-on approach is taken during the fire simulation module of the curriculum. A very important component of the program that is understated or overlooked is the outstanding quality and credibility of the instructors. This combination makes for an extremely valuable learning experience. The program does not pretend to convert students into highly proficient decision-makers during the two-week session. It does, however, provide the student with a framework that can be brought back to his or her own agency. Here it can be adapted to fit their needs and become a regular part of their training.
More on RPD in the next issue.
1. Lloyd Layman, Fire Fighting Tactics, published by the National Fire Protection Association. (return to text)
2. Ibid. (return to text)
3. Gary A. Klein, Roberta Calderwood, and Anne Clinton-Cirocco, Rapid Decision Making on the Fire Ground, Defense Technical Information Center, Technical Report 796, 1988. (return to text)
4. Ibid. (return to text)
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