Real World Use of ICS for Structure Fires

By Anthony Kastros

The house fire is the most common structure fire and has the most fatalities to civilians and firefighters alike, so it makes sense to start here.  House fires represent 80 percent of the structure fires in the United States and 1,000 house fires occur a day in America. 

Another important fact to begin our discussion is that the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) top five causes of firefighter death on the fireground are:

1. Improper risk assessment (poor size up) 

2. Lack of incident command

3. Lack of accountability

4. Inadequate communications

5. Lack of SOG’s or failure to follow established SOG’s.  We will refer to these as “The NIOSH 5” in this article.  Notice that all of these causes surround command.

These five causes are what predicated many of the events that show up on NIOSH line of duty death (LODD) pie charts.  It's more important that we look at what operational events (or lack thereof) led up to things like getting lost, asphyxiation, trauma, etc.  It's one thing to know that someone died of trauma, it's another thing to know that he was pushed off a cliff. The NIOSH 5 tell us how our firefighters are getting pushed off cliffs.

If we hope to reduce the number of firefighter line of duty deaths on the fireground, then we must command fires in a way that attacks all five of the above causes. 

Structure fires must be treated with the utmost respect. Each fire presents unique challenges. That being said, we must have a consistent and systematic way to approach these fires if we hope to consistently run an effective incident. That's why SOG's are so important and why it's listed as number 5 in the above list. That being said, no system will replace the astute fire officer who knows his/her job. 

ICS does not take the place of Strategy and Tactics, SOG’s, or most importantly, thinking officers who are able to evaluate and act upon key fireground factors like smoke/fire conditions, building construction, occupancy, etc. 

One of the principles of ICS is that it is a simple-to-complex system; whereby divisions, groups, branches and sections are not formulated until a need arises. The need is derived by the incident, so the common phrase, “the incident drives ICS, ICS does not drive the incident” is used. This is a true statement. 

The potential for problems arise when we forget that ICS was designed for managing wild fire incidents on a large scale that can span weeks long. IAP’s are developed by Planning Sections and the risk is managed appropriately as the ICS is built, after the initial attack phase of the fire. 

The phrase, “simple-to-complex” must be redefined for the structural arena. The modern structure fire has become a “complex” incident upon dispatch. We need not look farther than national statistics and firefighter fatalities.  

Just in northern California, we have had several sentinel events in the past two-and-a-half years. Two firefighters were killed in a small Contra Costa home in July, 2007. Three firefighters were trapped when a roof fell in a commercial building in Sacramento in June, 2008 and four firefighters narrowly escaped a house fire in October, 2008 in the same region. Two firefighters fell into a residential garage fire in Modesto on New Year’s Day, 2010, sustaining significant burn injuries. Again, all of these incidents occurred in the past two-and-a-half years and most in homes which strengthens the case that even a “bread-and-butter” house fire is no longer a simple or routine event. 

Well known emergency industry risk expert Gordon Graham classifies these as high risk, low frequency events, meaning they pose the greatest risk, and we do them the least, compared to medical emergencies for example. Perishable skills degrade and this creates the greatest potential for injury or death. 

Modern structure fires have become complex due to many factors, including changes in building construction, fire loading and the use of low mass synthetics, to name a few. Flashovers are occurring much faster due to modern building practices like higher insulation ratings, double/triple paned windows, and petroleum based interior decor. Add to this light weight construction, gusset plating, OSB, TJI, tile roofing, and it's no wonder we are having more significant injuries. 

To compound the problem, we have fewer fires, less experienced officers and mass attrition. Although house fires are the most common, the overall number of fires is decreasing annually, further hampering the ability to maintain a well experienced firefighting core. 

To meet this challenge, we must plan ahead, remaining ahead of the incident power curve. This is another principle of effective command: plan ahead. We must anticipate what the fire will or could do and allow for reflex time in ordering resources, evacuating structures, placing additional lines into service, etc. 

Just as we must evacuate a building before the roof collapses, we must set up a solid command structure before it is needed, in anticipation of the worst, while hoping for the best. No one expected the killed and trapped firefighters described in the above four incidents, but they happened. Our job, as incident commanders is to expect and prepare for the unexpected. 

An effective command structure MUST go beyond an IC and Safety Officer. Two command officers will not be enough to effectively manage structure fires consistently, or prevent a sentinel event, let alone manage chaos that will ensue upon a mayday, firefighter down, or even the discovery of a civilian rescue. 

In short, just because some of our house fires are routine and easily mitigated, doesn't mean the next one will be. 

The IC and safety officer represent the Strategic Level of the incident. Their sphere of awareness is the greatest, as they are the furthest away from the incident.  They can see the “big picture”. That being said, the big picture is often limited to the “A” side of the structure for the IC, is obscured by smoke, trees, night, apparatus and a host of other factors. 

By contrast, the company officer’s sphere of awareness at the Task Level is typically 3-6 feet. He is engaged in stretching lines, cutting holes, or searching for victims, etc. In a smoke filled IDLH environment, the sphere of awareness through an SCBA can even be reduced to zero. 

The missing link on most of our structure fires is at the Tactical Level. This is represented by the division/group supervisor. His sphere of awareness is 20-50 feet. This distance is closer than the IC and more mobile, but back away enough from the Task Level to see changing smoke/fire conditions, building conditions, crew location, access/egress, etc. 

The division/group supervisor becomes the eyes/ears for the IC, and the guardian angel to the crews performing tasks in the hazard zone. The supervisor is mobile and able to see conditions changing from all sides of the building. He is in the “Warm” zone, able to perform clear conditions/actions/needs (CAN) reports to the IC and conduct eyes-on/hands-on accountability. He is able to communicate face-to-face with his crews, consolidating critical information, thereby reducing radio traffic. 

Another way to analyze the three levels on the fireground is that the IC is the “Sitting Boss” in the cold zone. The division/group supervisor is the “Walking Boss” in the warm zone and the company officer is the “Working Boss” in the hot zone. 

The goal of incorporating division/group supervisors early is not to create a top-heavy, bureaucratic command system. The goal is to support the tasks being accomplished on the fireground and prevent as many of The NIOSH 5 from aligning as possible. This will not reduce the number of crews performing tasks, or require more companies to be dispatched as will be outlined in the example below. 

ICS is more than checking boxes and creating divisions and groups. One of the most critical components is division of labor. Division and group supervisors become the eyes and ears for command. Often times, the incident command post (ICP) is not in an ideal location to view the incident. The IC will not see critical fireground factors like changing smoke conditions, fire/building conditions, entry point of crews, etc. These factors are quickly overlooked by crews operating at the Task Level who are focused on stretching line and going inside. 

Even if an IC were to depart his vehicle, lap the structure with a portable, and attempt to see the incident this creates problems. He will miss radio traffic, be unable to manage two frequencies, be difficult to contact face-to-face by crews, and may even need PPE and an SCBA to navigate the area. This violates all the principles of having a stationary ICP. 

A person at the Tactical Level must be present to consolidate single resources (companies) into groups and divisions that are focused on the main objectives of fire attack, search, vent and RIC. 

Simply having an IC and safety officer (who often arrives late) on a house fire is not using ICS to its potential in the structural fire arena. If an IC has all companies reporting to him/her, then a gap is created between the Strategic and Task levels of the incident. CAN reports are muffled by SCBA and even if the ICP is across the street, the B, C and D sides are not monitored effectively by the IC. To compound problems, most communication to the IC is by radio, creating a bottle neck, especially when things go bad. Compound this with feedback from surrounding radios and transmissions become useless. 

Safety must be integrated earlier and simultaneously to the critical operational areas of the incident. On a house fire, for example, an interior division supervisor would also act as the safety officer for the interior of the house, managing the main objectives of search and fire attack. The vent group supervisor would be the officer on the roof, with the responsibilities of safety and managing the vertical vent. The RIC group supervisor would be responsible for the RIC functions, and have a support role to Interior Division regarding accountability and sitstat/restat of crews through lateral face-to-face communication. 

This integrates three safety officers into the incident with three different views, often much earlier than a second arriving BC. The second arriving BC could then take over the group/division needing the most supervision, most likely Interior Division for a house. 

Proactive use of ICS (setting up groups and divisions early) has the following benefits:

• Keeps span of control minimized - Currently, as a BC in the Sacramento Region, for example, you would have an 8:1 ratio upon dispatch. If both trucks split into two-person teams (as often happens), you have a potential for a 10:1 ratio. That’s 10 crews reporting directly to the IC. Add to this two radios (Tactical and Command), MDT, maps and code 3 driving and any BC would lose track of crews prior to arrival. Setting up groups and divisions ASAP will enhance accountability and communications if/when things go bad. 

• Improves accountability – The division and group supervisors represent the Tactical Level of the incident. The single resources are the Task Level (pulling lines, searching, cutting holes, etc). The Tactical Level officers (Interior, Div A, Vent Group, RIC Group) are the eyes and ears of the incident and feed Command (Strategic Level) important info through CAN reports. For example, the interior division supervisor on a house fire would be lapping the structure, looking at fire/smoke conditions, ensuring effective line placement, accounting for crews, considering air management, talking to bystanders, etc. Interior would literally have a hands-on, eyes-on accounting for crews. This is much more effective than through radio traffic while using a worksheet. Interior would be in a better position to launch 2-Out sooner since he can hear AND see much better than the IC in the SUV across the street. He would also be in a position to prevent things like premature placement of positive pressure fans that could make things worse. 

• Improves communications – The interior division supervisor, for example would do a lot of face-to-face communication with his companies, thus reducing radio traffic. When Command asks Interior if a search is complete, Interior would simply state that it’s “in progress”. Once the search crew came out and told Interior (face-to-face) that the primary is completed, Interior would tell Command on the radio – “Primary clear. ”  This again reduces radio traffic and frees the crews inside to work and not have to keep answering the radio.  Also, utilizing group/division designators on the radio reinforces the main objectives of the incident. "Interior" talks to "Vent" and "RIC". If things go bad, we focus on those designators and PAR’s can be completed hands on, simultaneously within the divisions/group and more effectively than having every single resource (again, up to 10 crews) PAR to command on the radio. Communication bottle neck happens!

• Improves safety – The division and group supervisors have a greater sphere of awareness at the Tactical Level than crews inside smoke or cutting a hole at the Task Level. They are also closer than the IC to the activity. The crews inside the building are run by “working bosses” in the hot zone.  Div/group sups are in the warm zone, as “walking bosse.s” Their job is to be the safety officer for their area, watch conditions, watch the back of the crews in the hot zone, control access/egress and coordinate with other groups/divisions. For example, an IC in a poor ICP location and crews in zero visibility could both miss smoke conditions that show a flashover is imminent. The interior division supervisor could kick Vent in the butt to get a hole cut, or would pull crews out if he thought it would take too much time for the hole or additional lines that could improve conditions. 

• Matches the intensity of the incident – Today’s house fire has become an intense combat zone. Most firefighter and civilian fatalities are in house fires. They are not “bread and butter” anymore. We must meet the fast paced intensity with a proactive organizing mechanism. Things peak and are done very fast. If we wait to organize the crews, we can quickly get behind the power curve, especially if we call a second alarm or have a sentinel event. We must anticipate and plan ahead for the worst, hoping for the best. 

An example of a house fire, utilizing three-person engines and four-person trucks:

• First engine (E1) arrives, initiates fire attack (Task Level), passes command, and assigns the second in engine to bring a water supply. 

• Second engine (E2) arrives, and assumes Command. The firefighter can stretch a 2-Out line while the captain laps the structure and the engineer assists with water supply to the first engine. 

• First truck (TR1) arrives and splits. Team 1 goes to the roof for vertical vent and assumes “Vent Group” (Tactical/Task Level). Team 2 goes inside to conduct a primary search, remaining as “TR1 Team 2” (Task Level). 

• At this point, the initial IC has a 4:1 span of control:E1 (initiating fire attack), E2 crew (2-out), TR1 Team 2 (searching), TR1 Team 1 (Vent Group). 

• First BC (BC1) arrives and assumes Command. He bumps E2 captain from Command to “Interior Division” with E1, E2 and TR1 Team 2 reporting to Interior Division Sup (This consolidates these three crews (Task Level) under one Division Supervisor (Tactical Level). Notice that the crews at the Task Level never changed their designators! This keep communications clean, thus attacking one of The NIOSH 5. 

• Third engine (E3) arrives and can take a second line inside, search, etc, reporting to “Interior Division. ”

• Fourth engine (E4) arrives and is assigned RIC Group. If the original 2-Out line is advanced into the structure as a third attack line, they would pull a second 2-Out line as one of their tasks. 

• Second Truck (TR2) goes as needed (possibly splitting) and reports to appropriate division or group (Interior, Vent or RIC), based on the needs of the incident. 

• Medic arrives and assumes Medical Group. Obviously, you may have chosen to use a fire medic as 2-Out. Then another medic should be dispatched for Medical Group. We should always have an available medic on scene in case we have a firefighter injury or unknown victim found. 

• At this point the BC would have a 4:1 span of control (Interior, Vent, RIC, and Medical), even though he has 9 companies on the scene. This gives him four sets of eyes (safety officers) on the incident, simultaneously. 

• Upon the arrival of the second BC (BC2), he may assume Interior Division from E2 Captain, for example. 

The organizational chart would look like this:

We list the division/group supervisors first. 

This is just an example of a house fire with a four-engine, two-truck response. Adjustments must be made for differing apparatus response and staffing levels, but hopefully this template is a good example. 

Common criticisms of using ICS on house fires:

“ICS is simple to complex. House fires are not complex. ”

“This takes hands off the work. There are too many bosses, and not enough workers. Pretty soon, we’ll all be standing around with vests and clip boards while the building burns to the ground.”

• The worst case net change is one less officer inside after command is transferred to the BC. The initial IC (captain of second engine) bumps to Interior Division Sup (Tactical Level) instead of Task Level operations. He may have already assigned his crew to the first engine captain, or they may be 2-Out. He may opt to go inside if conditions are mild (confined garage fire), pull hose at the front door, or deploy 2-Out, etc. His efforts are most likely better utilized lapping the structure, accounting for his crews and giving clear CAN reports to the IC. 

• No clip boards and vests, just better communications. "Interior" talks to "Vent", "RIC" talks to "Interior", etc. There is no need for Task Level officers to attempt to track all assignments on the radio. That’s the division/group supervisor’s job. A Task Level officer simply needs to know who his boss is and what his objective is. 

• The Interior Division Supervisor will know via hands-on accountability where his crews are (again, attacking The NIOSH 5). He’ll know when they actually went in and when they actually come out. If he needs to speak to them while they are in the IDLH, he can don his mask, quickly enter, conduct face-to-face dialogue, then exit the IDLH, remove his mask-mounted regulator and give a CLEAR CAN to IC. 

“One size does not fit all.”

“We tried using ICS before and it didn’t work.”

The answer to the challenge is training. If we do not train and become outstanding at this, we will say, “See, it didn’t work.” Implementation is the key. Excellent reference and training resources include the Blue Card System, found at www.BShifter.com, or www.YouTube.com. Here you can see examples of outstanding incident command by Battalion Chief Mike Alder of San Bernardino Fire Department. 

1. Improper risk assessment (poor size up).

2. Lack of incident command.

3. Lack of accountability.

4. Inadequate communications.

5. Lack of SOG’s of failure to follow established SOG’s. 

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