Dave McGrail

Offensive to Defensive: Making a Smooth Transition

The Fire

Fire companies have just been dispatched to a reported fire in a medium-sized commercial building. Upon arrival, companies encounter heavy smoke conditions and proceed to initiate an aggressive interior attack; they are now in an Offensive Operating Mode. Before long, all of the companies assigned on the first alarm have arrived and the incident commander (IC) has put them all to work.

As precious minutes pass by the IC has mixed thoughts as to whether or not interior crews are making positive progress. Unfortunately, the IC has not yet asked for any assistance in the form of upgrading the initial assignment or asking for a second alarm.

The fire continues to burn, and the IC becomes more and more anxious. Eventually, the IC tells the interior sector to pull out and prepare for a Defensive Operation; but interior teams reply by saying that they "almost have it knocked." The IC succumbs to this subtle pressure and leaves his crews inside.

After several minutes into the operation, the fire ground is filled with the eerie sound of low air warning bells and an occasional P.A.S.S. device alarm coming from behind the thick walls of smoke. A faint glow of orange can now be seen through several windows on both the Alpha (A) and Bravo (B) sides of the fire building. The IC knows that he is now in a very bad position, and it will be tough to recover.

Suddenly, the dreaded words "Mayday! Mayday! Mayday!" are heard blaring from portable radios across the fire ground. A portion of the structure has collapsed, injuring several firefighters and trapping one. Somehow, probably by sheer fire-ground luck the trapped firefighter is pulled out along with the other injured firefighters. Of course, there is now an urgent order given over the radio for all companies to evacuate the building. "Everyone get out of the building, we’re going defensive," says the IC.

Crews from the inside are now pouring out of every available opening in an effort to quickly get out of this death trap alive. As the firefighters narrowly make it out of the building they are quickly ordered to get lines stretched and supply master streams in a hap hazard effort to mount an effective exterior attack.

Eventually, an exterior attack gets underway and after several hours, countless cups of lukewarm coffee, and a few day-old donuts, the fire is finally extinguished. Somehow everyone survives this incident, and the injuries sustained by a few firefighters turn out to be minor. Although tragedy is narrowly averted, this will be remembered as just another fire. There are no critiques, but everyone knows deep down inside, they were lucky.

A Vicarious Experience

Does this sound familiar? Have you ever been directly or indirectly involved with such an operation? I, unfortunately or perhaps fortunately, have. Unfortunately, because it’s obviously a very poor and dangerous operation. The fortunate part is the opportunity to learn how not to command a fire-ground operation. Think of it as a vicarious experience.

In my first FireNuggets article, I addressed metal security grates and the death of our Brother Firefighter Mark Langvardt, (Engineer, Truck Co. No. 16, Denver F.D.). I talked about the so-called “dominos” that I believe will begin falling on the fire ground, one after another, on a path toward tragedy. That tragedy can be the death of a firefighter, among other things.

Let’s take a closer look at the dominos that fell throughout the previous fire-ground scenario. Ultimately, we will identify some of the procedures that can be taken in order to effectively and as safely as possible complete the transition from an Offensive Operating Mode to a Defensive Operating Mode.

Manpower

The first item of concern is that of manpower. It has always been a very big issue in the American fire service. Today, NFPA 1710 and 1720 are the hot topics, both of which address the minimum number of firefighters needed to successfully and safely conduct a fire-ground operation for paid and volunteer organizations, respectfully. The available manpower, or lack thereof, is a major factor associated with fire-ground operating modes.

There are no fire departments (at least that I know of) who suffer from too much manpower. For most of us, budget cuts and political apathy have put us in a position of living by the motto “Do More with Less.” However, when push comes to shove, most medium and large fire departments have the ability to muster enough resources to mount an effective attack on most fires. For larger paid departments, this means calling for help within your own organization by requesting extra alarms. For major emergencies, firefighters from off-duty shifts might be called back to work on an emergency-recall basis. Smaller departments must depend on one another for mutual-aid and automatic-aid agreements. If your organization is extremely small, with no realistic mutual aid close enough to provide timely assistance, then you may have to opt for a Defensive Operating Mode early in your operation.

In this article, I will address and focus specifically on those circumstances when a reasonable number of resources and manpower is available to mount an effective attack in an Offensive Operating Mode and smoothly transition to a Defensive Operating Mode.

In the previous scenario, the failure of the IC to call for assistance was one of the first dominos to fall. A good rule of thumb to follow is to always ensure that you have uncommitted, reserve resources (companies and manpower) immediately available. Generally, this means that there are companies in staging. For example, an extra engine and truck company placed in staging is not unreasonable or unrealistic for a fire in an average-sized single-family dwelling. Remember, the Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) is a company of firefighters that is committed to an operation; that is, standing by to rapidly intervene and rescue a firefighter or firefighters in need of assistance.

Another good rule of thumb for the IC is to never allow himself to get into a position where he has “all hands” operating but no companies in staging or responding to the incident. Keep in mind that at the outset of most fires, especially serious fires in large buildings and multiple dwellings, there is plenty of work for everyone and there will not likely be any extra resources to spare early on in the incident.

The key here is: Have you called for help? The good IC must always be very proactive. Ask yourself, what will this fire be like five minutes from now? Think ahead. Plan ahead. Call for help before you need it. Make every attempt to have a reasonable number of resources available in staging, close by, ready to go to work when you need them.

Why is it that some IC’s are reluctant to call for help until it is too late? I believe that the answer involves pride and in some cases perhaps a little ego. We all want to be able to take care of business: “I can handle it. I don’t need any help. What will others think if I ask for help? What if I ask for help and it turns out that I don’t need them? That Chief sure made a ‘Big Deal’ out of that nothing fire!” Statements like these are at the root of the problem. I truly believe that when an IC calls for help it is not a sign of weakness, but rather a sign of strength. Furthermore, there truly is strength in numbers. That strength is in the form of firefighters, enough firefighters to successfully and safely bring your fire under control. I believe that the textbook fire-ground operation occurs when some of the fire companies that responded are never even put to work. Call for help early, before you need it. If it turns out that you don’t need them, send them home, simple as that!

Manpower, Resources, etc. Whatever you want to call it, you must have enough firefighters in order to stop the fire. We probably all agree on that point. The tricky part is how we get them there. Plan ahead and be creative — use the resources within your own organization, or request mutual aid, automatic aid, etc.

Proper Apparatus Placement

Master-stream Appliances

Remember, our long-term goal here is to smoothly transition from an Offensive Operating Mode to a Defensive Operating Mode. If we’re going defensive, it certainly means that we will be getting the “Big Guns” out, (master streams, tower ladders, ladder pipes, etc.). Therefore, a critical component to the smooth transition is that of proper apparatus placement.

On the fire ground, there is truly one opportunity to complete effective and proper apparatus placement. That opportunity happens upon arrival of the very first fire company. Those fire department vehicles that are not equipped with some sort of aerial device or fixed master-stream appliance must yield to those that are so equipped. Engine companies with triple combination pumper apparatus must get out of the way. There are three specific options:

Stop short of the fire building.
Go past the fire building.
Get across the street from the fire building, if possible.

Simply put, a typical pumper apparatus carries thousands of feet of hose and has a very powerful high-volume fire pump. With this modern equipment, and given a sufficient water supply, an effective fire stream can be developed several hundred feet from the pumper. However, most fire departments are limited with their aerial apparatus to a typical maximum distance of 100 feet — with the exception of those few fire departments that own one of those “Brontosaurus Burger” sky ladders.

Ultimately, strong discipline based on a solid program of training and development, along with practical experience, makes proper apparatus placement a fire-ground reality. In order to maximize the “scrub area,” aerial devices and fixed master-stream appliances must be in the appropriate location. If an engine company lays a five-inch supply line across the street and spots directly in front of the fire building, forget about getting any other apparatus into position. Even the command officer can be the primary offender when he drives his Suburban down the narrow street and stops right in front of the fire building. One must be very diplomatic when asking the chief to move out of the way. How about the cops? We all know where they park. Well, that’s a problem that might take several years and millions of dollars to solve!

OK, we did it: proper apparatus placement. The big guns are in place. Now go to work. If an interior attack in the Offensive Operating Mode is appropriate, so be it. Remember, the primary reason we are inside the building is the possibility of saving human lives. Many times, this operation will be successful; and the need for a Defensive Mode will not occur. However, if it does, we are preparing for that possibility.

With the big guns in place, it is time to use some of those additional resources for water supply. I’m not talking about supply for hand lines here; that should have been taken care of already. This water supply is for the master streams, such as tower ladders, ladder pipes, etc. And, no, we are not applying water into or onto the fire building; we are still in the Offensive Mode. We are simple getting ready. Additional engine companies with their respective pumper apparatus hooked up to hydrants and pumping water to the respective master-stream appliances, tower ladders (Chief John Norman calls them Water Monsters). We are now ready and have an arsenal in place should Plan A (the interior attack) prove to be too dangerous or simply unsuccessful.

Time, Building Construction, Progress

At this point, it simply becomes a matter of time. Certainly, there are countless other factors that will go into the decision to move to a Defensive Mode, but time and the progress, or lack of progress, being made by interior crews are two significant benchmarks. For the IC with so much going on, time becomes a very cloudy concept. Forget about a stopwatch; have somebody else keep track of the time for you. Like many departments, the Denver Fire Department uses fire dispatchers to monitor the fire-ground tactical channel and notify the IC at specific time intervals. For example, "Fire Dispatcher to 34^th Avenue Command, you are ten minutes into your incident." This in turn prompts the IC to give an update of the fire-ground progress and helps aid in the decision to go Defensive, based on the progress made, or not made, during that time period.

Of the countless size-up factors, building construction sits high on the list of items to consider when thinking about going Defensive. Historically, the twenty-minute rule was used by many chief officers as the benchmark for getting out of a building. However, as we all know, with today’s lightweight construction and truss assemblies, twenty minutes is far too generous for many of today’s buildings. In some cases, the actual time could be a short as five minutes.

The type of building construction and the time are significant factors, but there are collectively countless other items that the IC must consider. The progress or lack of progress being made by interior crews is significant. The IC may have a different impression of that progress than the teams inside. Therefore, one of the most important things an IC can do to help himself is to place a strong, experienced, and competent leader, for whom you have a great deal of trust and respect, in the position of interior sector officer.

With all that said, it still comes down to you, the IC. You’re standing outside of the fire building. You’re in a safe position. Your companies inside are working in a very hostile, dangerous, and dynamic atmosphere. Use all of your experience, intuition, and the countless fire-ground factors. Most importantly, trust yourself and go with your feelings. If it doesn’t feel right, get them out!

Be proactive, and, in order to make a smooth transition, move to your Defensive Operating Mode before you are actually forced to do so. Notify all sector officers, companies, etc., that you are going to a Defensive Operating Mode. The retreat from the building should be orderly and safe, but don’t waste anytime — get out. Also, use whatever accountability system your department has to account for all members. A so called PAR is not just a golfing term, it is also a Personal Accountability Report. The IC contacts his sector officers, who, in turn, contact their company officers, who account for the safety and welfare of all the firefighters under their respective command. Once a successful PAR has been completed, the defensive weapons (water monsters) can be put to work.

Most importantly, if you, as the IC, think that it’s time to go to a Defensive Operating Mode, don’t let someone talk you out of it. Remember, firefighters are winners. They don’t like to be defeated, or even think that they have lost. The perception that many of them will have on the inside of a fire building is very narrow in scope. They might be knocking down a lot of fire and making progress in one area, not realizing that the fire has gotten behind or above them. As the IC, you have the big picture. Take it all into careful consideration, then make your decision and stick with it. Always error on the side of safety. You will sometimes be criticized, but with a thick, skin that’s easy to handle. However, not even a thick skin can shield you from the emotions of a firefighter’s funeral.

Making the Transition

With all of the components in place, let’s try our scenario once again, but this time plug in the items necessary for a smooth transition.

Fire companies have just been dispatched to a reported fire in a medium-size commercial building. Upon arrival, companies encounter heavy smoke conditions; and the officer from the first arriving company requests help in the form of a second alarm, mutual aid, automatic aid, etc. Because of a possible life hazard, the companies proceed to initiate an aggressive interior attack; they are now in an Offensive Operating Mode. Before long, all of the companies assigned on the first alarm have arrived and the incident commander has put them all to work. However, because of the early call for help, companies on the second alarm are now arriving in staging.

The IC requests the appropriate equipment, manpower, companies, apparatus, etc. from staging to begin setting up for a Defensive Operation. The staging officer is instructed to maintain at least two engine companies and one truck company in staging. Additional alarms will be called for if it is anticipated that the resources in staging will drop below this level.

Like many fires, this one could go either way. However, from the moment the first company arrived, all of the strategic and tactical decisions made at all levels of command will effect the outcome of the incident, either positively or negatively. As precious minutes pass by, the IC has mixed thoughts as to whether or not interior crews are making positive progress. The IC makes contact with the interior sector officer and asks whether or not they are making positive progress. The interior sector officer reports that they are not making progress. At the same time, the fire dispatcher contacts command and reports that he is ten minutes into this fire-ground operation. That, along with several other size-up factors, including building construction, dictates a move to a Defensive Operating Mode. The IC announces the order for all interior crews to back out of the building and prepare for a Defensive Operation.

A personal accountability report is completed and all members are accounted for. Because of proper apparatus placement and proactive fire-ground tactics, master streams are already in place and ready to go. The IC gives the order to commence with the Defensive Operations.

The companies and firefighters that operated inside the building are now sent to rehab for a well deserved rest, hydration, and perhaps some food. They will likely be sent back to staging to be used during the remainder of this operation. They are all tired, wet, and cold; but they are alive.

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